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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the value of public information in a Cournot
duopoly where there is uncertainty about the market demand and/or the cost function. We
provide conditions that allow one to determine whether the value of public information
is positive or negative. With every Cournot duopoly in a certain class, we associate a
real-valued function (defined on a convex subset of the positive orthant of the real plane)
whose curvature determines whether the value of public information is either positive or
negative: if this function is convex (concave) then the value of public information is positive
(negative). Using this fact we identified interesting subclasses of industries where the value
of public information is positive (negative). We also show the usefulness of our results to
determine the value of public information in specific applications.
There is a considerable literature studying the value of public information in general
equilibrium. Hirshleifer (1971) shows that improving public information may make agents
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worse off ex-ante in an exchange economy where agents share risks. Several papers
generalize aspects of Hirshleifer examples—see, e.g., Marshall (1979), Wilson (1975),
Green (1981), Sulganik and Zilcha (1996). In a recent paper, Schlee (2001) shows that
in this context the value of public information is negative in any economy where there is
a representative agent. Contrary to Schlee’s result, in our context we can easily generate
examples of classes of industries for which the value of public information is positive.
There are also a number of papers that study the value of information in a linear
oligopoly.1 Ponssard (1979) investigates this issue in an industry where there is uncertainty
about the market demand, and where some firms are informed about the state of nature and
other are uninformed. Vives (1984) studies the value of information under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition in a duopoly where demand is uncertain. Also in a linear
duopoly where firms are uncertain about their costs, Sakai (1985) investigates the value
of information under a variety of information structures.
In studying the value of information in a Cournot oligopoly some difficulties emerge.
Specifically, the associated non-cooperative game with incomplete information may not
have a unique and/or interior equilibrium. When the game has several equilibrium points, it
is not clear which equilibria to compare. And when equilibrium is not interior, comparative
static exercises are difficult as corner equilibria are characterized by a set of inequalities
rather than a system of equations. Moreover, it is easy to produce examples of industries
whose associated game has a unique and interior equilibrium, for which altering the firms’
information structure by adding public information leads to a new game whose unique
equilibrium is a corner equilibrium (see Example 4.1 below).
All the papers mentioned above circumvent this problem by directly assuming that the
games associated with the industries under study have a unique and interior equilibrium,
even though it is not difficult to find examples where this assumption is violated.
Instead, we identify a class of Cournot duopolies (not necessarily linear) with symmetric
information for which the game associated to each industry has a unique interior
equilibrium. This allows us to define the value of public information for any industry in
this class, and study conditions under which it is either positive or negative. In addition,
our model of incomplete information does not impose any restriction of the space of states
of nature or on the character of firms’ information. In particular, our framework allows for
continuous as well as discrete information structures.
There are other topics on information in oligopolistic environments that have received
attention in the literature. Gal-Or (1985, 1986), for example, studies the incentives for
information sharing, and Einy et al. (2002) examine whether information advantages are
rewarded in equilibrium. Studying these issues involves exercises different from those
performed in the present paper. Determining whether a firm may have an incentive to reveal
(part or all of) its information to a rival, for example, requires to compare the payoffs of
the firm in two games that differ in the information of the rival. Or determining whether a
firm with superior information enjoys greater profits requires to compare the profits of the
firms in a (given) game. Our results offer no conclusion regarding these issues.
1 In a recent paper, Ottaviani and Pratt (2001) study the value of public information in a monopoly
2
2. The model
Consider a duopolistic industry where two firms compete in the production of a
homogeneous good. There is uncertainty about the industry’s demand and the firms’
costs. This uncertainty is described by a probability space (Ω,F ,µ), where Ω is the
set of states of nature, F is a σ -field of subsets of Ω, and µ is a σ -additive probability
measure on (Ω,F). (We interpret µ as the common prior of the firms.) Once the state
of nature ω ∈ Ω is realized, the market demand, and the firms’ costs are determined.
Write p :Ω ×R+ → R+ for the inverse market demand function, and for i ∈ {1,2} write
ci :Ω ×R+ → R for Firm i’s cost function. The information of Firm i ∈ {1,2} about the
state of nature is described by a σ -subfield Fi of F ; that is, given an event A ∈Fi , Firm i
knows whether the realized state of nature is a member of A. We refer to Fi as Firm i’s
information field. A duopolistic industry with incomplete information is thus described by
a collection I = ((Ω,F ,µ),p, c1, c2,F1,F2).
Throughout the paper we assume that the inverse demand function, p, and the cost
functions, c1 and c2, of any duopolistic industry with incomplete information are such that
for every integrable function q , the functions qp(· , q(·)), c1(· , q(·)), and c2(· , q(·)) are
also integrable.
Let I be a duopolistic industry with differential information. The Bayesian game asso-
ciated with I is the collection G(I)= ((Ω,F ,µ),R2+, (F1,F2), (π1,π2)), where for each
firm i ∈ {1,2} the set of possible actions is R+, and its profit function πi :Ω ×R2+→R is
given for all ω ∈Ω and r = (r1, , r2) ∈R2+ by
πi(ω, r)= rip(ω, r1 + r2)− ci(ω, ri).
We refer to G(I) as the Cournot game with incomplete information associated with the
industry I. In this game, a (pure) strategy for a firm i ∈ {1,2} is an Fi-measurable function
qi :Ω→R+ whose first and second moments exist. We denote by Si the set of all strategies
for Firm i, and by S = S1 × S2 the set of profiles of strategies.
Let X be an integrable random variable on (Ω,F ,µ), and let G be a σ -subfield of F .
We write E(X | G) for the conditional expectation of X with respect to G. Let G(I)
be a Cournot game with incomplete information. A Bayesian equilibrium is a profile of
strategies q∗ = (q∗1 , q∗2 ) ∈ S such that for every i ∈ {1,2} and every qi ∈ Si,
E
(
πi
(· , q∗(·)) ∣∣Fi)(ω)E(πi(· , (qi(·), q∗−i(·))) ∣∣Fi)(ω), (2.1)
for almost every ω ∈ Ω . (Our assumptions on p, c1, c2 and on the set of strategies of
every firm guarantee that for all i ∈ {1,2} and q ∈ S, and for every σ -subfield G of F ,
E(πi(· , q(·)) | G) exists.)
Remark 2.1. Equilibrium condition (2.1) requires that at a Bayesian equilibrium every
firm maximizes its (interim) conditional expected profits at every state of nature. This
condition is equivalent to requiring that each firm maximizes its ex-ante expected profits;
i.e., condition (2.1) is equivalent to
E
(
πi
(· , q∗(·)))E(πi(· , (qi(·), q∗−i(·)))), (2.2)
for every i ∈ {1,2} and every qi ∈ Si.
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Proof. Clearly (2.1) implies (2.2). To prove the converse, assume that (2.1) does not hold;
then there is i ∈ {1,2} and qi ∈ Si such that
E
(
πi
(· , qi(·), q∗−i(·)) ∣∣Fi)>E(πi(· , q∗(·)) ∣∣ Fi)
on some event A ∈Fi with µ(A) > 0. Define qˆi :Ω→R+ by
qˆi(ω)=
{
qi(ω) if ω ∈A,
q∗i (ω) if ω ∈Ω\A.
Then qˆi ∈ Si and
E
(
πi
(· , qˆi(·), q∗−i(·)))
=
∫
Ω
πi
(· , qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ
=
∫
A
πi
(· , qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ+
∫
Ω\A
πi
(· , qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ
=
∫
A
E
(
πi
(· , qi(·), q∗−i(·)) ∣∣Fi)dµ+
∫
Ω\A
πi
(· , q∗i (·), q∗−i(·))dµ
>E
(
πi
(· , q∗(·))).
Thus, (2.2) does not hold. ✷
3. The value of public information
In this section we study the value of public information in a symmetric duopoly; i.e., in
an industry I where both firms have identical information (i.e.,F1 =F2 = G) and cost (i.e.,
c1 = c2 = c). Thus, a symmetric duopolistic industry I can be described by a collection
((Ω,F ,µ),p, c,G). (For economy of notation we do not repeat c and G.) We refer to
the game G(I) associated to a symmetric duopolistic industry as a Cournot game with
symmetric information.
Theorem 3.1 provides conditions on the demand and cost functions that guarantee
existence, uniqueness, symmetry and interiority of Bayesian equilibria in a Cournot game
with symmetric information. Note the “multiplicative” nature of the uncertainty in demand
and cost assumed in Theorem 3.1. The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on Amir (1996)
for existence and uniqueness, although in order to guarantee the measurability of the
equilibrium strategies we have to appeal to Aumann’s Measurable Selection Theorem—see
Aumann (1969). For interiority and symmetry we provide an argument based on first-order
conditions for profit maximization.
Theorem 3.1. Let I = ((Ω,F ,µ),p, c,G) be a symmetric duopolistic industry. Assume
that for all (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+, p(ω,x) = α(ω)f (x) and c(ω,x) = β(ω)x, where
α,β :Ω→R++ are integrable functions and f :R+→R+ satisfies
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(3.1.1) there is x¯ ∈R+ such that f (x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, x¯), and f (x)= 0 for x  x¯;
(3.1.2) f is differentiable and strictly decreasing on [0, x¯);
(3.1.3) f is log concave on [0, x¯); and
(3.1.4) α(ω)f (0) > β(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈Ω .
Then G(I) has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (q∗1 , q∗2 ). Moreover, q∗1 (ω) = q∗2 (ω) ∈
(0, x¯/2) for all ω ∈Ω .
Proof. For every ω ∈ Ω define the two-player game of complete information G(ω, I)
where each player i ∈ {1,2} set of pure strategies is R+, and its payoff function
σi(ω, ·) :R2+→R+ is given by
σi
(
ω, (x, y)
)=E(πi(· , (x, y)) ∣∣ G)(ω),
where
π1
(· , (x, y))= xp(· , (x + y))− c(· , x)
and
π2
(· , (x, y))= yp(· , (x + y))− c(· , y).
It is easy to check that under assumptions (3.1.1)–(3.1.4) the game G(ω, I) satisfies the
assumptions of Theorem 2.3 of Amir (1996) and therefore has a unique Nash equilibrium,
(q∗1 (ω), q∗2 (ω)). We show that q∗(·)= (q∗1 (·), q∗2 (·)) is a Bayesian equilibrium ofG(I). We
first show that q∗(·) is a G-measurable function. Define the correspondence E :Ω→ 2R+
by
E(ω)= {(x, y) ∈R2+ ∣∣ (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω, I)}.
We show that the graph of the correspondenceE is measurable with respect to the product
σ -field G ⊗B(R2+),whereB(R2+) is the σ -field of Borel subsets ofR2+. For all (a, b) ∈R2+
let D(a,b) be the set{(
ω, (x, y)
) ∈Ω ×R2+ ∣∣ σ1(ω, (x, y)) σ1(ω, (a, y)) and
σ2
(
ω, (x, y)
)
 σ2
(
ω, (x, b)
)}
.
Since for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ the functions σ1(· , (x, y)) and σ2(· , (x, y)) are G-measurable,
and for all ω ∈ Ω the functions σ1(ω, ·) and σ2(ω, ·) are continuous in R2+, then for all
(a, b) ∈R2+ the set D(a,b) is G ⊗ B(R2+)-measurable. Now, the graph of E is given by
graph(E)=
⋂
(a,b)∈R2+
D(a,b)=
⋂
(a,b)∈Q2+
D(a,b),
where Q2+ denotes the set of duples of non-negative rational numbers. Since the set Q2+
is countable, graph(E) is G ⊗B(R2+)-measurable. Thus, by the Measurable Selection
Theorem (see Aumann (1969) and Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 1 on p. 54)), there exists
a G-measurable function φ :Ω → R2 such that φ(ω) ∈ E(ω) for almost all ω ∈Ω. Since
for all ω ∈ Ω the set E(ω) is a singleton (because G(ω, I) has a unique equilibrium),
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φ(ω) = q∗(ω) for almost all ω ∈Ω, and therefore q∗ is a G-measurable function. Now,
for each i ∈ {1,2} and qi ∈ Si we have
E
(
πi
(· , q∗(ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω)E(πi(· , (qi(ω), q∗−i(ω))) ∣∣ G)(ω),
for every ω ∈Ω , and therefore
E
(
πi
(· , q∗(·)))E(πi(· , (qi(·), q∗−i(·)))),
which by Remark 2.1 establishes that q∗ is an Bayesian equilibrium of G(I).
Uniqueness of q∗ follows from the fact that for all ω ∈Ω the gameG(ω, I) has a unique
equilibrium.
It remains to show that for all ω ∈ Ω, q∗1 (ω) = q∗2 (ω) ∈ (0, x¯/2). Let ω ∈ Ω.
We first show that q∗1 (ω), q∗2 (ω) ∈ (0, x¯). If q∗i (ω)  x¯ for some i ∈ {1,2}, then
p(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω))= 0, and therefore σi(ω, (q1(ω), q2(ω)) < 0, which contradicts that
(q∗1 (ω), q∗2 (ω)) is an equilibrium of G(ω, I) (because a Firm i can guarantee itself zero
profits by producing qi(ω)= 0). Thus q∗i (ω) < x¯ for all i ∈ {1,2}.We show that q∗i (ω) > 0
for all i ∈ {1,2}. Assume by way of contradiction that q∗i (ω) = 0 for some i ∈ {1,2}.
Without loss of generality set i = 1. The Kuhn–Tucker condition for profit maximization
implies
E
((
p
(· , q∗2 (ω))− β(·)) ∣∣ G)(ω) 0. (3.1)
If q∗2 (ω)= 0, then by (3.1) we have
E
(
p(· ,0) ∣∣ G)(ω)E(β(·) ∣∣ G)(ω),
which contradicts condition (3.1.4). If x¯ > q∗2 (ω) > 0, then Firm 2’s first-order condition
for profit maximization implies
E
(
q∗2 (ω)p′
(· , q∗2 (ω))+ p(· , q∗2 (ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω)=E(β(·) ∣∣ G)(ω).
And since p′(· , q∗2 (ω)) < 0 and q∗2 (ω) > 0, we have
E
(
p
(· , q∗2 (ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω) > E(β(·) ∣∣ G)(ω),
which contradicts (3.1).
Finally we show that q∗1 (ω)= q∗2 (ω) < x¯/2. Since 0 < q∗i (ω) < x¯ for all i ∈ {1,2}, the
first-order conditions for profits maximization imply
E
(
q∗i (ω)p′
(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω))+ p(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω)=E(β(·) ∣∣ G)(ω)
for all i ∈ {1,2}. Therefore
E
(
q∗1 (ω)p′
(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω)=E(q∗2 (ω)p′(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω)) ∣∣ G)(ω),
and since (q∗1 (ω), q∗2 (ω)) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω, I), we have q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω) < x¯.
Hence p′(· , q∗1 (ω)+ q∗2 (ω)) < 0, and therefore q∗1 (ω)= q∗2 (ω) < x¯/2. ✷
Throughout the rest of the section let us be given a probability space (Ω,F ,µ).
A symmetric duopolistic industry I is thus described by a demand and a cost function,
and a σ -subfield G of F . Given a market demand p and a cost function c, define the binary
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relation  on the family of all σ -subfields of F as follows: If G and H are two σ -subfields
of F , then
H G ⇔
{
E
(
p(· , x) ∣∣H)=E(p(· , x) ∣∣ G ∨H) and
E
(
c(· , x) ∣∣H)=E(c(· , x) ∣∣ G ∨H) ∀x ∈R
}
. (3.2)
(Here G ∨H is the smallest σ -subfield of F that contains both G and H.)
The interpretation of the binary relation  is simple: H  G if (and only if) the
predictions of demand and cost functions (the uncertain parameters of the industry) are
the same whether the firms information is given by H, or by the aggregate information
in G and H (i.e., by G ∨H). The binary relation  contains that introduced in Blackwell
(1951); i.e., ifH is more valuable than G in the sense of Blackwell (1951), thenH G, but
the converse may not hold: If H and G are generated by finite partitions of Ω , for example,
thenH is more valuable in the sense of Blackwell than G if and only ifH⊇ G—see Laffont
(1989, Theorem 1 in Chapter 4). It is clear that H⊇ G impliesH G, and therefore that 
contains Blackwell’s relation. However, it is easy to construct an example for whichH  G
even though H G—for an example of this kind, see Example 1 in Einy et al. (2002).
Now, consider an industry where the market demand is given for (ω, x) ∈Ω ×R+ by
p(ω,x)= α(ω)f (x), and where firms’ cost is c(ω,x)= β(ω)x, where α,β :Ω→ R are
F -measurable integrable functions. Then
H G ⇔ {E(α |H)=E(α | G ∨H) and E(β |H)=E(β | G ∨H)}. (3.3)
Let p :Ω × R+ → R and c :Ω × R+ → R be given for (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+ by
p(ω,x) = α(ω)f (x), and c(ω,x) = β(ω)x, where α,β and f satisfy the assumptions
of Theorem 3.1. For every σ -subfield G of F consider the symmetric duopolistic industry
I = ((Ω,F ,µ),p, c,G). By Theorem 3.1, the Cournot game G(I) has a unique Bayesian
equilibrium, which is symmetric. Denote this equilibrium by (q∗G, q
∗
G), and the equilibrium
profit by π∗G . We say that the value of public information in the industry I is positive(negative) if for every σ -subfield H of F
H G ⇒ E(π∗H)E(π∗G)(E(π∗H)E(π∗G)). (3.4)
That is, the value of public information is positive (negative) if having better information
does not decrease (increase) firms’ expected profits.
Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying the assumptions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theo-
rem 3.1. Define
K(f )= {(α,β) ∣∣ α,β :Ω→R++ are integrable and f (0)α(ω) > β(ω) ∀ω ∈Ω}.
Note that K(f ) is a convex subset of L1(Ω,F ,µ)× L1(Ω,F ,µ). We denote by I(f )
the class of duopolistic industries of the form I = ((Ω,F ,µ),p, c,G) where G is a σ -sub-
field of F and p and c are such that there exists (α,β) ∈ K(f ) for which p(ω,x) =
α(ω)f (x) and c(ω,x) = β(ω)x for all (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+. Each industry I ∈ I(f ) is
determined by a pair (α,β) ∈K(f ) and a σ -subfield G of F , and can be described as I =
((Ω,F ,µ),αf,β,G). For every (α,β) ∈ K(f ) we denote by (q(α,β), q(α,β)) the unique
equilibrium of the Cournot game with symmetric information associated with the industry
I = ((Ω,F ,µ),αf,β,F), and by π(α,β) = αq(α,β)f (2q(α,β)) − βq(α,β) the equilibrium
profit. Also we define the function U :K(f ) → R by U(α,β) = E(π(α,β)). Clearly
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U(α,β) is well defined on K(f ). Define the set M(f )= {(x, y) ∈R2++ | f (0)x > y},
a convex subset of R2+, and let the function V :M(f )→R be given by
V (x, y)=U(x1Ω,y1Ω). (3.5)
Note that V is convex on M(f ) if and only if U is convex on K(f ).
Remark 3.2. Let (α,β) ∈ K(f ). For every σ -subfield G of F we have (E(α | G),
E(β | G)) ∈K(f ) and
U
(
E(α | G),E(β | G))=E(πG),
where πG is the firms’ profit at the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game with
symmetric information associated with the industry ((Ω,F ,µ),E(α | G)f,E(β | G),F).
Proof. Simply note that (α,β) ∈ K(f ) implies f (0)E(α | G)(ω) > E(β | G)(ω) for all
ω ∈Ω. Therefore (E(α | G),E(β | G)) ∈K(f ), andU(E(α | G),E(β | G))=E(πG). ✷
Proposition 3.3 below is an analog of a well-known result in Blackwell’s model.
However, since the binary relation  defined in (3.2) contains Blackwell’s ordering, the
conclusion of Proposition 3.3 is stronger than that obtained in Blackwell’s framework.
Proposition 3.3. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1. If the function V defined in (3.5) is convex (concave) on M(f ), then the
value of public information is positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry
I ∈ I (f ).
Proof. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theo-
rem 3.1, and assume that V is convex on M(f ). (If V is concave the proof is analo-
gous.) Let I ∈ I(f ). Thus I = ((Ω,F ,µ),αf,β,G) for some (α,β) ∈ K(f ) and some
σ -subfield G of F . Let H be a σ -subfield of F such that H G. By Remark 3.2, in order
to prove that
E(πH)E(πG),
we must show that
U
(
E(α |H),E(β |H))U(E(α | G),E(β | G)).
By Theorem 34.4 in Billingsley (1995) we have
E(α | G)=E(E(α | G ∨H) ∣∣ G) (3.6)
and
E(β | G)=E(E(β | G ∨H) ∣∣ G). (3.7)
It is also easy to see that
U
(
E(α |F ′),E(β |F ′))=EV (E(α | F ′),E(β |F ′)), (3.8)
for every σ -subfield F ′ of F . Hence (3.6)–(3.8) imply
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U
(
E(α | G),E(β | G)) = EV (E(α | G),E(β | G))
= EV (E(E(α | G ∨H) ∣∣ G),E(E(β | G ∨H) ∣∣ G)). (3.9)
And since V is convex on M(f ), Jensen’s Inequality implies
EV
(
E
(
E(α | G ∨H) ∣∣ G),E(E(β | G ∨H) ∣∣ G))
EV
(
E(α | G ∨H),E(β | G ∨H)). (3.10)
Since H  G, then E(α | G ∨H) = E(α |H) and E(β | G ∨H) = E(β | H). Therefore
(3.9) and (3.10) imply
U
(
E(α | G),E(β | G))EV (E(α |H),E(β |H))=U(E(α |H),E(β |H)). ✷
In order to show the usefulness of Proposition 3.3 to determine the value of information
in a symmetric duopolistic industry we present several applications.
Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1.
Denote by I0(f ) the class of industries of the form I = ((Ω,F ,µ),α0f,β,G) ∈ I(f ),
where α0 is a positive constant number. Thus, in every industry in the class I0(f ) the
demand is known with certainty and only the cost is uncertain. Also denote by I1(f )
the class of industries of the form I = ((Ω,F ,µ),αf,β1,G) ∈ I(f ), where β1 is a
positive constant number. In every industry in the class I1(f ) the cost is known with
certainty and only the demand is uncertain. Let the function V0 : (0, f (0))→ R be given
for y ∈ (0, f (0)) by V0(y)= V (1, y).Also let the function V1 : (1/f (0),∞)→R be given
for x ∈ (1/f (0),∞) by V1(x)= V (x,1).
Proposition 3.4 provides a criterion for determining whether the value of public
information is positive or negative for industries in the classes I0(f ) and I1(f ),
respectively. The proof of Proposition 3.4 is analogous to that of Proposition 3.3 and is
omitted.
Proposition 3.4. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1, and let G be a σ -subfield of F .
(3.4.1) If V0 is convex (concave) on (0, f (0)), then the value of public information is
positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry I ∈ I0(f ).
(3.4.2) If V1 is convex (concave) on (1/f (0),∞), then the value of public information is
positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry I ∈ I1(f ).
Our next proposition establishes that we can determine whether the function V is convex
(concave), by checking whether either V0 or V1 is convex (concave).
Proposition 3.5. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3)
of Theorem 3.1, and assume that f is twice continuously differentiable on [0, x¯). The
following conditions are equivalent:
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(3.5.1) V is convex (concave) on M(f );
(3.5.2) V0 is convex (concave) on (0, f (0));
(3.5.3) V1 is convex (concave) on (1/f (0),∞).
Proof. Proposition 3.5 follows from Lemma 3.6 below and the fact that V is homogeneous
of degree one. ✷
Lemma 3.6. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1, and assume that f is twice continuously differentiable on [0, x¯). Then
sign(Vxx)= sign(Vyy). Moreover, if Vxx(x, y) 0 (Vxx(x, y) 0) for all (x, y) ∈M(f ),
then V is convex (concave) on M(f ).
Proof. We show that for all (x, y) ∈ M(f ) the function V :M(f ) → R defined by
(3.5) satisfies Vxx(x, y)  0 if and only if Vyy(x, y)  0. Let (x, y) ∈ M(f ) and let
(q(x,y), q(x,y)) be the unique equilibrium of the industry I = ((Ω,F ,µ), xf, y1Ω,F), and
write Q(x,y)= 2q(x,y). Then, for all i ∈ {1,2} and qi ∈ Si we have
q(x,y)
(
xf
(
Q(x,y)
)− y) qi(xf (qi + q(x,y))− y).
Therefore, uniqueness of equilibrium implies
Q(x,y)=Q
(
1,
y
x
)
.
Also the first-order conditions for profits maximization imply
1
2
xQ(x, y)f ′
(
Q(x,y)
)+ xf (Q(x,y))= y.
Hence
V (x, y) = −1
4
x
(
Q(x,y)
)2
f ′
(
Q(x,y)
)= x(−1
4
(
Q
(
1,
y
x
))2
f ′
(
Q
(
1,
y
x
)))
= xV
(
1,
y
x
)
.
Thus, for λ > 0 we have
V (λx,λy)= λxV
(
1,
λy
λx
)
= λV (x, y);
i.e., V is homogeneous of degree one. By Euler’s Theorem
V (x, y)= xVx(x, y)+ yVy(x, y),
and therefore
xVxx(x, y)+ yVyx(x, y)= 0 and yVyy(x, y)+ xVxy(x, y)= 0.
Thus x2Vxx(x, y) = y2Vyy(x, y), and therefore sign(Vxx(x, y)) = sign(Vyy(x, y)), and
Vxx(x, y)Vyy(x, y)−Vxy(x, y)Vyx(x, y)= 0. Since the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix
of V at (x, y) are 0 and Vxx(x, y)+ Vyy(x, y), then Vxx(x, y) 0 (Vxx(x, y) 0) for all
(x, y) ∈M(f ) implies that V is convex (concave) on M(f ). ✷
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The following remark is a direct implication of Proposition 3.5.
Remark 3.7. If the value of public information in every industry I ∈ I0(f ) (or I ∈ I1(f ))
is positive (negative), then the value of public information of every industry I ∈ I(f ) is
positive (negative).
Theorem 3.8 establishes useful conditions under which the value of information is
positive in an industry. These conditions are essentially the same that Novshek (1985)
imposes to guarantee existence of a Cournot equilibrium. (Condition (3.8.1) is the main
condition of Novshek’s Theorem 3.)
Theorem 3.8. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1. If f is thrice differentiable on [0, x¯) and for all x ∈ [0, x¯) satisfies
(3.8.1) xf ′′(x)+ f ′(x) 0 and
(3.8.2) f ′′′(x) 0,
then the value of public information in any industry I ∈ I(f ) is positive.
Proof. Let f be a function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.8 and let I ∈ I(f ).
By Proposition 3.5 we may assume, without loss of generality, that I ∈ I0(f ). Thus the
industry I is described by a collection I = ((Ω,F ,µ), f, y1Ω,G), for some 0 < y < f (0).
We show that V ′′0 (y)= Vyy(1, y) 0 for 0 < y < f (0), and therefore that V0 is convex on
(0, f (0)).
Let 0 < y < f (0), and let (qy, qy) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot
game associated with I. Write Q(y)= 2qy. We have
V (1, y)= Q(y)
2
(
f
(
Q(y)
)− y).
First-order conditions for profit maximization imply
Q(y)
2
f ′
(
Q(y)
)+ f (Q(y))= y. (3.11)
Therefore
V (1, y)= −Q
2(y)
4
f ′
(
Q(y)
)
.
By (3.8.1) Q(y) is the unique solution to the equation
z
2
f ′(z)+ f (z)= y.
By the Implicit Function Theorem, Q is differentiable on (0, f (0)). Thus, differentiating
(3.11) we get
Q′(y)= 2
Q(y)f ′′(Q(y))+ 3f ′(Q(y)) .
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Direct calculation yields
V ′′0 (y)=
−f ′(Q(y))(Q2(y)f ′′′(Q(y))+ 6Q(y)f ′′(Q(y))+ 6f ′(Q(y)))
2(Q(y)f ′′(Q(y))+ 3f ′(Q(y)))3 . (3.12)
Since f ′ < 0 on [0, x¯), (3.8.1) and (3.8.2) imply V ′′0 (y) 0. Therefore V0 is convex on
(0, f (0)), and by Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of public information in every industry
I ∈ I(f ) is positive. ✷
The following result is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.8.
Corollary 3.9. Let f :R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1. If f is concave, thrice differentiable on [0, x¯) and satisfies f ′′′(x)  0 for
0 x < x¯, then the value of public information in any industry I ∈ I(f ) is positive.
We now apply our results to some examples.
Example 3.10. Let f be given for x ∈R+ by
f (x)=max
{
a0 −
n∑
i=1
aix
λi ,0
}
,
where a0 > 0, ai  0, and λi  1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The function f satisfies conditions
(3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. Let G be a σ -subfield of F , and for 0 < y < a0 = f (0) let
(q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the
industry I = ((Ω,F ,µ), f, y1Ω,G). Write Q(y)= 2q(y). Now, we have
x2f ′′′(x)+ 6xf ′′(x)+ 6f ′(x)=
n∑
i=1
(
λ2i + 3λi + 2
)
aix
λi−1 < 0
and
xf ′′(x)+ 3f ′(x)=−
n∑
i=1
λi(λi + 4)aixλi−1 < 0.
Since f ′(x) < 0 for all x > 0, (3.12) yields V ′′0 (y) > 0 for all 0 < y < a0 = f (0). Thus,
V0 is convex on (0, a0), and therefore by Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of information
in any industry I ∈ I(f ) is positive.
Example 3.11. Let f be given for x ∈R+ by
f (x)=
{
(x − a)2 if 0 x  a,
0 otherwise,
where a > 0. The function f satisfies conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. Let G
be a σ -subfield of F , and for 0 < y < f (0)= a2 let (q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian
equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the industry I = ((Ω,F ,µ), f, y1Ω,G).
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Write Q(y) = 2q(y). It is easy to check that the first-order conditions for profit
maximization yield 0Q(y) a/2 for all 0 < y < a2. Now, for all 0 < y < a2 we have
Q(y)f ′′
(
Q(y)
)+ f ′(Q(y))= 4Q(y)− 2a  0 and 0= f ′′′(Q(y)).
Therefore by (3.12) we have V ′′0 (y) > 0 for all 0 < y < f (0). Thus, V0 is convex on
(0, f (0)), and therefore by Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of public information in any
industry I ∈ I(f ) is positive.
Example 3.12. Let f be given for x ∈R+ by
f (x)=
{
(1− x)3 if 0 x  1,
0 otherwise.
The function f satisfies conditions (3.1.1)–(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1 on [0,1). Let G be
a σ -subfield of F , and for 0 < y < 1 = f (0) let (q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian
equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the industry I = ((Ω,F ,µ), f, y1Ω,G).
Write Q(y) = 2q(y). It is easy to check that the first-order conditions for profit
maximization imply 0Q(y) 2/5 for all 0 < y < 1. Direct computation yields
Q(y)f ′′
(
Q(y)
)+ 3f ′(Q(y))= (1−Q(y))(15Q(y)− 9)< 0
and
Q2(y)f ′′′
(
Q(y)
)+ 6Q(y)f ′′(Q(y))+ 6f ′(Q(y))=−60Q2(y)+ 72Q(y)− 18,
for all 0 < y < 1. Now, when y approaches 0, Q(y) approaches 2/5, and thus the above
expression is negative. Therefore by (3.12) we have V ′′0 (y) < 0 for all 0 < y < y¯, where
y¯ > 0 is sufficiently small that the above expression is negative. Thus, V0 is concave on
(0, y¯), and therefore there exists a subclass J (f ) of I(f ) such that for any industry
I ∈J (f ) the value of public information is negative.
4. Extensions: asymmetric information
We conclude the paper with an example that illustrates the difficulties that emerge when
firms are asymmetrically informed. In this example the Cournot game associated with the
given industry has a unique interior Bayesian equilibrium, but the game obtained by adding
some public information has a unique corner equilibrium.
Example 4.1. Let (Ω,F ,µ) be a probability space, whereΩ = {ω1,ω2,ω3},F = 2Ω, and
µ(ω1)= 1/2, µ(ω2)= 3/8, µ(ω3)= 1/8. Define p :Ω ×R+ →R for (ω,Q) ∈Ω ×R+
by
p(ω,Q)=
{80−Q if Q 80,
0 otherwise.
Also let c :Ω ×R+ →R be given for (ω,Q) ∈Ω ×R+ by c(ω,Q)= β(ω)Q, where
β(ω)=
{20 if ω = ω1,
1 if ω = ω2,
77 if ω = ω3.
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1 ∨ G = 2Ω, and F2 ∨ G = G. The unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot
ame associated with the industry ((Ω,F ,µ),p, c,F1,F2) is (q1, q2) where q1(ω) =
2(ω) = 20 for all ω ∈ Ω. Also the Cournot game associated with the industry
(Ω,F ,µ),p, c,F1 ∨ G,F2 ∨ G), has a unique a Bayesian equilibrium, (qˆ1, qˆ2). In this
quilibrium we have qˆ1(ω3)= 0, and therefore it is a “corner” equilibrium.
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